Consequences of Military and Civilian Rule in Argentina: An Analysis of Central Government Budgetary Trade-Offs, 1961-1982 by Looney, Robert E. & Frederiksen, P.C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1987-04
Consequences of Military and Civilian




Looney, R.E., "Consequences of Military and Civilian Rule in Argentina: An Analysis of Central
þÿ G o v e r n m e n t   B u d g e t a r y   T r a d e - O f f s ,   1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 2 ,    C o m p a r a t i v e   P o l i t i c a l   S t u d i e s ,   A p r i l   1 9 8 7 ,
Volume 20, No. 1.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40620
Tbhis arti~~6~xa:~i~;;2:~:~:;e~~~~~~~l!~~~~~;:t~od~~enn~~~~~~ep~~~~::1~:;i:~.r;;~~;h~l etween . . d d . 1 de the defense share, two contro Multiple regression equations ~re esumatfe anh me u ·n the intercept and slope of the 
. d rt" 1 dummies to test or c anges I ... 
variables, an po 1_1ca . d"ff ntiated between (a) the first c1V1han 
equation as the regimes change. Regimes are I ere .. 
and. first military (b) the Peronists, and (c) the second m1htary. 
CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY AND 
CIVILIAN RULE IN ARGENTINA 
An Analysis of Central Qovernment 
Budgetary Trade-Offs, 1961-1982 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
P. C. FREDERIKSEN 
Naval Postgraduate School 
One of the major debates in the literature f~cuses on whether b:~r:! allocations, economic performan~e: policy_ outcomes, and t e 
change significantly with changes in poht1ca~ reg1~es. !o ~fiate~~h:~::;~ 
about an equal number of studies concludmg .t at s1gm ica . . 
does take place as there are studies sug~estmg_ the opposite. :~1s 
research has been criticized on two major pomts. First, the pref erab~1t~ 
of employing c~oss-national dat~ oAr tim~-ser~~!~~:~~ 9~e8~nn~t~~eth:t 
leng~h. In a major study o? Latm menca, 
the latter is more appropriate: · 
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The erratic growth pattern of Latin American countries also raises 
questions about the findings of cross-national studies of regime impact. A 
"snapshot" approach or examination at a single point in time may provide 
very misleading evidence (1978: 46). 
Remmer went on to point out that while cross-national comparisons are 
still useful, time-series case studies deserve greater attention. More 
recently, it has been suggested that "the cross-national regime type-
performance field of study may have outlived its usefulness" (Grosse, 
1982: 546). 
The second drawback of previous research has been directed at the 
use of a simple civilian/ military dichotomy to test for significant change 
as regimes vary (see Grindle, 1986: 5). As Weaver pointed out (1973: 
93-95) this classification system might also obscure any possible overlap 
between the regimes. In the same vein, there has been some criticism of 
studies that lump all military regimes together as one. As noted by 
Remmer (1985: 47): 
Obviously, military regimes do not form a homogeneous group. Military 
governments are reformist as well as conservative, populist as well as 
authoritarian, and personalist as well as corporatist. By aggregating all 
types of military regimes together, research to date has ensured that 
differences in regime type will appear irrelevant. 
The purpose of this article is to examine central government 
budgetary allocations between 1961 and 1982 for one country, Argen-
tina. This country has been selected for analysis due to the availability of 
recently published data (World Bank, 1985: 334-335) that lists budget 
allocations for all central government functions for the entire 20-year 
period. Furthermore there have been distinct changes in political 
regimes in Argentina since 1961 that permit us to differentiate among 
types of military regimes and types of civilian regimes thereby also 
accounting for the overlap suggested above by Weaver. Following a 
review of the literature, initial regression equations are estimated to 
examine the trade off between the share of the budget allocated to 
defense (the independent variable) and the share allocated to 13 
functional categories (the dependent variable). Control variables are 
included in the equations to control for cyclical patterns and long-run 
secular trends in the data. For each functional category two additional 
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equations are estimated to test for any significant chan~e (both in _the 
intercept and slope of the relationship) in the allocations as regime 
changes occurred. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
As early as 1963, Eckstein (p. 1012) suggested that: 
. . h , penders and if they're stingy 
governments are either stingy or t ey re s . , Id sa that the 
bout defense they're stingy about everything. I wou_ . . y . ~istorical reco~d suggests that the associati?n between c1v1han spending 
and military spending is positive, not negative. 
. . d" sh ·uer(l97l)examined the 
In one of the earliest statistical stu_ ies, . c m1 . H l ded that 
consequences of different regimes m Latm A.menca. e ~one u es the 
budgetary allocations were partially e~plalmed b~ re:::~e1:fn Latin 
s were not In one of the few smg e coun ry outco~e 1 h . Hayes ( 1975) focused on Brazil between 1950 and 
Amenca ore sew ere . . d h the anticipated 
1967 .. She found that m_i~~~~ ~~:~~~ga~~ t~~tt mfi~;ary governments 
~~:a~i;:se~~~~~~~::~~ei relationship betwe~n dm;li:~:~ ~;:i~i~:~ :~~ 
economic development. I~ fa~t, -~he ~o~~euis;ue of growth and this 
civilian regimes may be quite simi _ar o . . " . 
similarity is reflected in their spending policies. (197;. 5~J~cation and 
A d Goff (1975) focused on allocations o 
mes an . d . Latin America between 1948 and 1968. ~~;yn~~:~~~~~~~~e~~:;:su~~s of political varia?les d~d little to p;edic~ 
f M over economic variables were oun 
levels of education or de ense. ore M K 1 and Cohen ( 1976) 
to be superior ~redicto~s. Af yhear later:nic cpe:~;~ance of all military 
re orted on their analysis o t e econo re~imes between 1951 and 1970. They found that: 
th~ ~ain parameters o;:b~~~ttea~~o;~:v:~~:r{e0:~a~~e e~~en~~i~y ;:r~ 
existing levels of_ deve ~d . d"cates that military regimes are more f While the ev1 ence m 1 . · l~:~;~~~~rf~rm better than their ~;ec;:~~;i~i~~~l:na~e;~~t~; ~~~::1~~~ 
is not umversally true. U nfor~~na e y . e that can explain the variation 
coup or the structure of_ the m1 itary reg1m . - I 0) 
in the levels of economic performance ( 1976. 309 3 . 
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Jackman examined 77 developing countries between 1960 and 1970 
and concluded that a change to a military regime has little effect on 
social change, "regardless of either the level of economic development or 
geographic region" ( 1976: 1096). In the same year, Dickson (1976: 341) 
reported his preliminary conclusions based on a study of IO Latin 
American countries. He found that military regimes tended to be more 
fiscally conservative (for instance, run lower deficits) and spend more on 
defense. Civilian regimes on the other hand were more oriented toward 
economic development and education. 
In summarizing the research so far, Remmer ( 1978: 41-42) noted that: 
The empirical studies of regime type, public policy, and policy outcomes 
conducted so far, whether focused on Latin America or including other 
areas as well, tend to support the conclusion that regime differences have 
little or no impact on public policy. 
She suggested that it was the specific economic characteristics of the 
country that dictated relative performance and not the type of regime. 
King (1981) suggested that the appropriate "performance measures" 
were material equality and welfare. He found that certain democratic 
regimes such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka had outperformed bureau-
cratic-authoritarian (B-A) regimes such as the Philippines and Indo-
nesia. A year later in a review of King's work, Grosse ( 1982: 543) argued 
that the "causal relation running from political democracy to lessened 
inequality is flawed on several counts and that ... there is no evidence of 
an association between democracy and lessened inequality or between 
authoritarianism and heightened inequality." 
Verner (1983) concentrated on budgetary trade-offs between defense 
and education in 18 Latin American countries between 1948 and 1979. 
In all countries except El Salvador he found that increased spending on 
defense did not lead to cuts in education. He concluded that "expla-
nations for particular defense/ education-spending trade-offs are largely 
country, time, or regime specific; perhaps no one explanation or model 
will be able to account for budgetary trade-offs for the Latin American 
region as a whole" ( 1983: 88). Two years later, Cohen ( 1985) compared 
the economic growth rates of B-A and democratic regimes in Latin 
America and examined the hypothesis that a B-A regime might spur 
economic growth at some late stage of the industrialization process. He 
found that B-A regimes "are somewhat more effective: Their contri-
bution to the average annual growth rate has exceeded that of the 
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Colombian democratic regime by half a percent" (1985: 133). He 
cautioned that while this was a significant contribution to growth, there /' 
were possible concomitant costs such as the suspension of democratic 
practices. 
As noted above, Grindle suggested that the usually adopted military/ 
civilian regime classification was inappropriate and possibly the cause j 
for the lack of any clear statistical relationship between regime and 
welfare in Latin America. Instead she proposed that characteristic f 
patterns of civil-military relations be used instead. However, she found , 
that: L.: 
the distinctions about civil-military relations ... do not emerge as strong 
factors in explaining military expenditures. Instead the relationship 
between patterns of growth of military expenditures and regime tenure is 
generalized across all types of civil-military relationships for the period 
considered, a finding not anticipated (1986: 15). 
METHODOLOGY 
As noted, the focus of this article is to examine whether budgetary 
allocations to various functional categories of the central government in 
Argentina are dependent on the defense allocation, the political regime, 
or both. The initial estimated equations for each function test for a 
statistical relationship between the defense share (the independent 
variable) and the other functional category share (the dependent 
variable). In addition these initial equations included two control 
variables. The deficit/ Gross Domestic Product ratio was included to 
control for the cyclical relationship between the budget and the share to 
defense, and either the per capita government expenditure or per capita 
income were included to control for the long-run secular movement in 
the defense budgetary shares. This approach was suggested by Verner 
(1983: 81 ). In other words, we have attempted to exclude some of the 
correlation between the defense share and the respective control 
variables. 
Since the amount allocated to General Administration for example is 
not likely to simply be a function of the defense share, the equations 
were reestimated after including dummy variables to account for regime 
i.··"' I , 
(', ', 
L 
L, ~ . 
r· 
i, ·,,,' 
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TABLE 1 
Argentina, Political Dummy Variables, 1961-1982 
YEAR DUMMYE DUMMYF 
1961 1 1962 1 1 1963 1 1 19611 1 1 1965 1 
1966 1 1 2 1967 2 1 1968 1 
1969 2 1 2 1970 2 1 1971 2 1 1972 1 
1973 2 1 0 1974 0 0 1975 0 0 1976 3 0 1977 2 
1978 3 2 
1979 3 2 
1980 3 2 
1981 3 2 
1982 3 2 3 2 
t~~e: Since 1961 there has been four distinct re . . 
CIVlhan regime 1966_ 1972 th fi . . gime~. 1961-1965 the first d . . . • . e mt m1htary regime, 1973-1975 th 
sec?n CIVlhan regime (Peronists), and 1976-1982 the second mirt e 
~~~e ~~~~get-dAuMthoritarian). !hese will be referred to as C~~~y 
, , an IL2, respectively As su est d b , ~~~~\~ s~~p~i:~~::g~a~d s~l~l~ ~~a civil~~/ ~ilit~;~~~~~~~;~: 
below) confirmed this result~r m1tia regression equations (discussed 
co!~~~~gad~~r~a!n~~~~;t~o~hsystems wer~ tri~d-for example 
variables that resulted in th~ bes~ :~~- ~laslsifications of dummy 
DUMMYE and DUMMYF is ica pattern below were 
-see Table 1. DUMMYE distinguished 
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between all four regimes. The Peronists (CIV2) were assigned a value of 
0 as they were least likely to cut back other expenditures as the defense 
share increased. For similar reasons, CIVl was assigned a value of I, 
MILi a valueof2, and MIL2 avalueof3. DUMMYFon the other hand 
coQsidcrs CIV I and MI LI as basically similar reflecting the possibility 
that the military personnel in MIU heavily influenced the CJ V l regime. 
This supports the classification suggested by Grindle (1986: 4). While 
there are only subtle differences between MILi and CIV l, major 
differences exist between CIV2 and MIL2. Once again the Peronists 
were assigned a value of 0. 
The following section presents and interprets the regression results. 
We have purposely reported only those equations that include 
DUMMYF since the results were superior to those that employed 
DUMMYE in all cases. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimated regression results appear in Table 2. Since we are 
testing to see whether regime changes in Argentina significantly alters 
the defense and nondefense tradeoff s the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is of limited interest; inasmuch as we have reported only the 
t-values.2 The results are grouped by 5 main functions and 8 sub-
functions. The first equation in each group represents the initial 
equation with only the defense share and the control variable on the 
right-hand side. The second and third equations introduce DUMMYF 
and DUMMYFX, respectively. 
The inclusion of DUMMYF tests for a significant change in a 
programs' share for a given level of defense as the regimes change; that 
is, we examine whether or not the intercept has shifted significantly. An 
alternative way a political change could alter the relationship between 
defense and nondefense programs is through a change in the slope of the 
equation. DUMMYFX (DUMMYF times the defense share) tests for 
this change. A statistically significant t-value indicates that important 
cutbacks (or increases) take place with changes in the defense share-the 
marginal propensity to spend on other programs is altered. 
For the most part, the results in Table 2 indicate that when regimes 
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government functions (that is, t-values for DUMMYF and DUMMYFX 
are statistically significant). Second, the results indicte that intercept 
shifts and slope changes are equally important (similar t-values). Third, 
in a majority of cases, there is a marked increase in the R 2 value as the 
two dummy variables are introduced. In those cases where there is a 
minor change in the R2 value, the coefficients of the dummy variables 
are not significant (for example, Domestic Security). Fourth, it appears 
that economic programs (Social Security, Total Economic Develop-
ment, and Transportation) are not affected nearly as much by political 
change as are other programs. 
With respect to specific programs, there is a significant trade-off 
(high negative t-value) between defense and seven other functions when 
the political dummy variables are included (General Administration, 
Total Social Expenditures, Education, Health, Housing, Agriculture, 
and Other Economic Development). In two cases, Energy and Fuels and 
Debt Servicing, there is a complimentary relationship between the 
program's share and the regime change. It appears that the military 
regimes favor these programs although one can argue that since little 
debt existed in the 1960s and 1970s, any regime would have faced 
debt-servicing problems following the increased borrowing of MIL2. 
Thus in most cases, by adding political variables (that is, weighting the 
defense share with a political variable) the results are quite different 
from those initially obtained. In other words, a spurious correlation 
between defense and nondefense programs can easily be obtained if 
political change is ignored-see equation l for example. The exceptions 
seems to be for Domestic Security and Social Security. With regard to 
the former (equations 4, 5, and 6) the R 2 is almost identical and the 
t-values are not statistically different from zero. The t-values for the 
defense share remain above 2.4. This is interpreted as a reflection of a 
high correlation between Defense and Domestic Security. In the case of 
Social Security the results are surprising and are contrary to the belief 
held in the literature that military regimes cut back this type of program. 
Our results indicate that Social Security is not manipulated at the 
expense of defense. However this point deserves a more indepth study 
on, for example, the composition of the benefits rather than the total 
value of the benefits. Mixed results were obtained for Agriculture . 
While the t-values become significant for defense and the political 
regimes as the dummies are introduced, there is little change in the R2 
value. Once again, this specific program is worthy of decomposition and 
further study. 
,,, 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented above indicates the critical role political 
change has played in shifting Argentinian budget priorities particularly 
with regard to the changing shares of nondefense items. Without taking 
regime type into account, few statistically significant budgetary trade-
offs between defense and nondefense programs can be identified. With 
regime change introduced into the analysis a number of significant 
budgetary patterns can be identified. These patterns are capable of 
extending our understanding of overall priorities associated with 
different political groupings. 
The results indicate that a simple dichotomy between civilian and 
military governments provides few insights to Argentina's budgetary 
allocation process. In addition, the military regimes show great dif-
ferences in their budgetary priorities. Some military regimes may have 
priorities more like some civilian governments than other military 
regimes. Furthermore, civilian regimes also differ greatly from one 
regime to the next. 
While any forecast of future budgetary allocations is risky even if one 
were to know the regime ahead of time, several tentative conclusions can 
be drawn from this study. It appears that military regimes are more 
likely to give priority to economic development and debt servicing and 
accumulation. Civilian regimes on the other hand are more likely to cut 
military spending as a means of expanding social programs, especially in 
the areas of education, health, and housing. Contrary to initial 
expectations, the share of the budget allocated to social security is 
extremely stable relative to changes in defense spending as regimes 
change. Perhaps military regimes are unwilling to risk alarming 
segments of the population by cutting these programs whereas civilian 
governments find it more popular to expand social pro~rfims. The 
military does not appear to. favor its major supporters-the rural 
oligarchy and business. Agricultural allocations are at best marginally 
increased by military regimes and may even be reduced. 
NOTES 
I. Available from the authors on request. 
2. The full setofequations(including DUMMYEand DUMMYF)withthe estimated 
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coefficients can be obtained on request A t-valu . . 
coefficient is statistically different fr . h e of I. 7 md1cates that the estimated 
at the 99% level. om zero at t e 90% level, 2.1 at the 95% level, and 2.9 
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